Mohammad Mohsen Haeri
Abstract
Recent years have seen a surge of attention to the problem of logical pluralism; most of which has been a reaction to Beall and Restall’s account of logical pluralism as the existence of more than one equally correct semantic relation of logical consequence. The underlying thesis is that the indeterminacy ...
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Recent years have seen a surge of attention to the problem of logical pluralism; most of which has been a reaction to Beall and Restall’s account of logical pluralism as the existence of more than one equally correct semantic relation of logical consequence. The underlying thesis is that the indeterminacy of the notion of validity goes beyond what the inductive-deductive distinction can precisify. The notion of deductive validity itself is indeterminate as well and this indeterminacy has its roots in the indeterminacy of the more fundamental notion of case. Cases are what make the premisses and the conclusion of an argument true; the most notable example being Tarskian models for classical logic. Deductive validity is the preservation of truth across all cases. This paper argues that unless this account of logical pluralism is supplemented with an argument in favor of the equal legitimacy of the purported cases it becomes merely a semi-controversial exposition of how different logics can be generated.
davood hosseini
Abstract
In this study, my aim is twofold: first to establish a relationship between the meaning of “existent” and the existence of existence; and second to give a new argument for the existence of existence. I will argue that in the presence of reasonable assumptions which all are conceded by Mullasadra, ...
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In this study, my aim is twofold: first to establish a relationship between the meaning of “existent” and the existence of existence; and second to give a new argument for the existence of existence. I will argue that in the presence of reasonable assumptions which all are conceded by Mullasadra, there is a close relationship between the fact that “existent” is semantically derived and the existence of existence. For this end, I first argue that, in the presence of reasonable assumptions which all are conceded by Mullasadra, “existent” with a semantically derived meaning is true of something if “existence” is true of something. Then, I will give some textual evidence that from Mullasadra’s point of view “existence” is true of something if existence exists. After that, I will give some textual evidence that for Mullasadra “existent” is semantically derived. These result a novel argument for the existence of existence, which does not have any predecessor in Mullasadra’s or his commentator’s texts.
Behnam Zolghadr; Davood Hosseini
Abstract
There are true contradictions in Ibn ‘Arabi’s theory of the Oneness of Being. The most important one occurs in his explanation of the relation between Being and beings. According to Ibn ‘Arabi, Being is identical with beings as well as it is non-identical with beings. Different philosophers, ...
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There are true contradictions in Ibn ‘Arabi’s theory of the Oneness of Being. The most important one occurs in his explanation of the relation between Being and beings. According to Ibn ‘Arabi, Being is identical with beings as well as it is non-identical with beings. Different philosophers, through hundreds of years, tried to dissolve this contradiction by giving consistent readings of Ibn ‘Arabi’s theory of the Oneness of Being. We will not follow this path. Instead, we accept those true contradictions and, thus, take the theory of the Oneness of Being to be a dialetheist theory. Our claim is that one can have a paraconsistent semantics of the theory of the oneness of being. To do so, we appeal to Graham Priest’s Gluon Theory. Gluon Theory concerns the problem of unity, i.e. what makes the plurality of an object’s parts into a whole. Gluon theory is a dialetheist theory and, thus, its semantics is a paraconsistent one. After giving a dialethiest reading of Ibn ‘Arabi’s Theory of the Oneness of Being, and explaining Gluon Theory, we will propose a translation of the former theory into the latter one. We will try to show that how Gluon Theory can explain the Theory of the Oneness of Being. In this essay, our focus is on the relation between Being and beings and, thus, other aspects of the Theory of the Oneness of Being will not be our main concern.
